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This paper investigates children’s time allocation to schooling, home production, and market production 
using a unique data set collected from northern Mali. Production shocks from harvest period pest 
infestations induce households to withdraw children from school and increase the probability that they are 
selected into farm work. Health shocks to women increases the probability that a child participates in the 
family business and childcare activities. These results are robust to varying assumptions about the 
structure of unobserved heterogeneity at the household and village levels. Different measures of 
household assets are also constructed to test whether assets serve as a buffer against increased child labor 
in response to shocks. Assets such as livestock have mixed effects on child labor and schooling, 
depending on the shock and asset type. However, household durables are substitutes for increased child 
labor when households face health shocks.  
Keywords: child labor, production shocks, health shocks, labor substitution effects 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Child labor is an economic imperative for many households, especially poor households in developing 
countries. The 2004 International Labour Organization estimate of working children aged 5-14 suggests 
that more than 190 million children work worldwide, of whom more than 49 million (26.4 percent of the 
region’s child population) reside in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hagemann et al. 2006). Children contribute to 
household labor supply when reserves of labor are essential at critical periods of the production process, 
supervision of labor is costly, and household production by children frees other household members to 
pursue remunerative market activities. While some children do contribute income directly to households 
through formal wage labor,
1 most often children perform a combination of market activities and/or 
domestic activities, especially in Africa. These market activities include unpaid agricultural production on 
the family farm and formal or informal family businesses. Domestic activities include household public 
goods such as food preparation, household cleaning, and provision of childcare for other siblings. Without 
children’s work, poor households lose one of the few mechanisms they have to increase incomes or 
smooth consumption in the face of economic shocks. This paper investigates children’s time allocation to 
schooling, home production, and market production. It uses a unique data set collected from northern 
Mali to examine the marginal effects of production and health shocks on child time allocation. In 
addition, the paper estimates the effect of assets on mitigating children’s withdrawal from school and 
increased participation in work activities.  
While the literature on children’s schooling is extensive
2 and the fertility literature explicitly 
models the quantity/quality tradeoffs among additional children,
3 the child labor literature has focused on 
the causes of children’s work (Basu and Van 1998; Basu 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000; Bhalotra and 
Heady 2003) and the substitution effects caused by household composition and birth order (Edmonds 
2006b and Emerson and Souza 2007). Increasing attention has also been paid to the income effect of 
production shocks and the ex-post changes in the distribution of children’s work and schooling caused by 
these shocks (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Jensen 2000; Beegle et al. 2006, de Janvry et al. 2006, Kruger 
2007). As Edmonds et al. (2007) note, our understanding of the mechanisms that determine child labor 
and schooling substitution effects are a critical lacuna in the literature. This paper contributes evidence 
regarding these substitution effects by using data that disaggregates children’s work to better reflect the 
multiplicity of activities that children carry out in the developing world. 
The paper also contributes to the literature by developing a model of children’s participation in 
market production, home production, and schooling. The model, developed in the paper’s second section, 
builds on Beckerian models of human capital investment in children within unitary household models 
(Becker 1965; Becker and Lewis 1973; and Becker and Tomes 1976), agricultural household models 
developed by Rosenzweig (1977a, 1977b, 1980), Singh et al. (1986), and de Janvry et al. (1991), and 
more recent models of child labor by Basu and Van (1998), Basu (1999), Baland and Robinson (2000), 
Cigno and Rosati (2005), and Edmonds (2007).  
The third section of this paper develops the econometric strategy for estimating the marginal 
effects of household and community characteristics and idiosyncratic shocks on schooling, home 
production, and market-oriented production. Three econometric specifications (a probit model, a probit 
model with shocks and shock asset interactions, and a multivariate probit model) are investigated with 
different assumptions about the structure of potential unobserved heterogeneity. These error term 
assumptions include household-level random effects, village-level random and fixed effects, and cross-
equation correlation to check for consistency across parameter estimates. Outcome variables include 
children’s participation in multiple types of activities and the child’s role in joint production. These 
                                                      
1 A child agricultural wage rate was reported in only 7 percent of the villages we surveyed, indicating the lack of a child 
agricultural labor market. Manufacturing is not a predominant economic activity in northern Mali, so children’s manufacturing 
wages were not collected in the village questionnaires.  
2 See, for example, Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Glewwe (2002), for a review.  
3 See for example Becker and Lewis (1973).  
  2
variables allow the examination of substitution effects within the household including the gender-
specificity of tasks or the multiplicity of activities that children undertake. This analysis is infeasible 
when children’s activities are aggregated into “work,” rather than reported as specific activities in which a 
child engages. The econometric strategy uses production shocks from harvest-period pest infestations that 
reduce household income and illnesses within the family that reduce total household labor availability in 
order to identify substitution patterns of child labor and schooling.     
The fourth and fifth sections of the paper describe the survey and the data collected in northern 
Mali. The sixth section presents the empirical results and investigates the role assets play in insuring 
against shocks and serving as buffers against the need to increase child labor. Different measures of 
household assets are constructed to test whether assets indeed serve as buffers against increased child 
labor in response to shocks. Results from investigating asset-shock interactions suggest that different 
asset types provoke different substitution effects within the household. To ensure that these results are 
robust to concerns about unobserved heterogeneity, model specification and endogeneity, robustness 
checks are conducted that include disaggregating the sample by gender and age, examining the effects of 
omitting household composition variables, and estimating the probability that a household reports a 
shock. The last section offers conclusions.   
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2.  MODEL 
The purpose of this model is to examine the mechanisms by which children’s time is allocated to different 
activities (education, home production, or market production) within an agricultural household model. 
The household decision problem is divided into three periods. In the first period, the household decides 
how many children to have given their existing birth-control possibilities, preferences, social norms, and 
expectations about the future of raising children. In the second period, the household incurs a fixed cost 
for each child born as well as the cost of providing food and consumption goods to the child in this 
period.  
The second period requires households to invest in their children, which will determine the 
child’s third period income. Investment in children comes from food and consumption goods provided to 
children, but also from the amount of schooling that children acquire. Parents allocate the time of their 
children between school, home production, and market production, deciding simultaneously their 
participation in these activities and the hours to be worked. The first and second periods can be thought 
of, in the Beckerian sense, as parental investment in both the quantity and quality of children. The third 
period ends as parents become old, consuming the return on their assets, and as children earn their own 
income.  
For ease of exposition, consider the last two periods of the allocation process and assume that the 
household maximizes an additive utility function over these two periods, considering its own 
consumption in period 2 and a discounted valuation of children’s consumption in period 3.  
Building on the Cigno and Rosati (2005) model of child labor in a unitary household, let a2 and a3 
be adult consumption in periods 2 and 3. Children’s period 2 consumption and period 3 income are 
represented by c2 and y3. Parents maximize a separable utility function with arguments that include their 
own periods 2 and 3 consumption as well as a discounted function of their n children’s period 2 
consumption and period 3 income when they become adults and form their own households.  
Utility Function:  23 23 (,) * (,) Uu a a n Uc y β = +  (1) 
The household faces a budget constraint in each period. In the second period, the household must 
divide its revenue from market production and home production between adult consumption and assets or 
savings, denoted k. For each of the n children born in period 1, a fixed cost is also incurred, b, which 
includes all the costs of childcare in period 1. Two other costs are borne by the household in period 2, the 
child’s period 2 consumption, 2 c , and the cost of schooling for each child who is sent to school, s. If s is 
set to zero, then the child does not go to school. In period 3, adults no longer work and children form their 
own households. The budget constraint for the household in period 3 is simply the return on the 
household’s assets invested from period 2.
4 
Budget Constraint Period 2:    22 2 1 ()
WW
AA YHw T a b cs n k ++ = + + ++  (2) 
Budget Constraint Period 3:    3 ar k =  (3) 
Both adults and children have time constraints. Adults divide their time among self-employed 
market production,
F
A T , home production, 
H
A T , the wage labor market, 
W
A T , and leisure activities, 
L
A T .  
Children divide their time among schooling,
S
C T , market production,
H
C T , home production,
H
C T , and 
leisure, 
L
C T . Parents choose simultaneously whether children work in a particular activity and the hours 
                                                      
4 Implicitly, the model makes two assumptions in Equations 2 and 3. The first is that period 1 production, consumption, and 
labor supply decisions have no impact on period 2 decisions. Second, the absence of credit markets and borrowing are constraints 
for households. Credit market transactions are small with short term loans that do not exceed one of the periods purposed by the 
model. Credit contracts of long duration or debt bondage are not considered in this model.   
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worked. If a child’s time is not allocated to a particular activity, the child’s time is set to zero. Because 
there is a low incidence of child wage labor in northern Mali, only the adult’s return in the wage labor 
market is modeled.  
The household generates profits from agricultural production or a home business via the market 
profit function in Equation 4. The revenues from the business are generated by scaling output from the 
production function, f, that converts adult and child labor given the quasi-fixed inputs capital, K, and land, 
L, by a vector of output prices, p. Adult and child labor inputs are valued at wage rates that represent the 
opportunity cost of the adult or child’s time. Domestic profits are valued according to a home production 
function minus the labor inputs that generate the final goods. Both production functions have positive first 
derivatives and negative second derivatives.  
Market Profits in Period 2:  2 (, | , )
FF F F F F
CA A A C C Yp q T TK L w Tw T δ =− −  (4) 
Domestic Profits in Period 2:  2 (,)
H HH H H H
A CA A C C H h T T wT wT =− −  (5) 
δ is a random production shock included in Equation 4 with E(δ)=1 and an i.i.d. distribution that 
represents unexpected positive or negative production shocks. These could include rainfall variation, crop 
losses due to insect or animal infestations, or household illness that affects market production.  
The child’s period 3 income is the return that the child (now an adult) receives on her labor given 
her cognitive development, E , and period 1 and 2 consumption. The child’s period 3 income is a function 
of her cognitive skills, E, which are developed in period 2, and of period 2 consumption, c2, which 
determines physical development and work capacity. Childhood nutrition is a critical component of future 
adult health, which contributes to the adult’s work capacity in period 3.  
Income Generation in Period 3:  33 2 (, ) Yw E c =  (6) 
Cognitive development is represented by a production function, E (Equation 7) with inputs 
including the child’s time in school, 
S
C T , schooling inputs such as books, s, and the school’s quality, Q. 
Following Glewwe (2002), a parameter of the learning efficiency of the child that is exogenously given is 
specified as θ. As θ increases, the cognitive development of the child increases. Included in θ are 
unobservable characteristics that increase a child’s cognitive development, such as innate ability, the 
child’s motivation, and the parent’s motivation to help the child learn. These unobservable characteristics 
are grouped in the vector θ. The interaction between unobservable household characteristics with school 
quality and time in school produces cognitive skills.  
Cognitive Skills:  (,)( )
S
C Ef Q s g T θ =  (7) 
The full model is outlined in Appendix A, but testable implications are developed from the 
solution to the household’s problem summarizing the conditions under which children’s time is allocated 
to schooling, home production, and market production. The comparative statistics of household shocks on 
child labor and schooling are also derived, and can be tested with the data.  
School 




ih S  is a discrete choice that 
depends on the following factors. First, if the shadow value of the child’s time is relatively high, then the 
demand on the child’s time in either the home or market production of the household in period 2 will 
outweigh any future benefit in period 3 that schooling may provide. Factors that increase child schooling 
include school quality, which increases the future benefits of cognitive skills. A child’s unobservable 
characteristics and her parent’s motivation to help her succeed in school, represented by θ, will also 
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∂  (9) 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, Equations A.8 could be solved to derive the optimal hours 
worked by the household’s child for the general case. Alternatively, if a Cobb Douglas production 
function is assumed for h, a closed form solution can be derived. By using this functional form, child and 
adult labor become either complementary or substitutes. Much of the child labor literature suggests that 
child and adult labor are substitutes. However, complementary adult and child labor seems to be the more 
intuitively plausible because it is relatively rare to see children working without adult supervision. This 
proposition is testable using analysis of the asset-shock substitution effects. Using the functional form 



























C T = , then Equation 11 characterizes the equilibrium condition. When the shadow value of 
the child’s time and the increase in the adult’s marginal utility from the return on the child’s time in home 
production are greater than the marginal utility from the change in productivity of the home production 
function due to the child’s labor, it is inefficient to allocate the child’s time to home production. The 
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The analysis of the allocation of children to the market production activities of the household is similar to 
the decision rules for the home production activities. However, the household’s decisions are driven by 
the marginal returns of allocating additional hours of child labor to market/farm production and the return 
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C T = , then from the first order conditions Equation 14 must hold which characterizes the 
discrete choice of child labor in market production: 
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∂∂
 (14) 
Equation 14 states that when the marginal utility value of adding an additional unit of child labor 
to market production exceeds the shadow value of the child’s time and the shadow wage, then a child will 
be allocated to market production.  Together with Equation 11, these equations suggest there are 
thresholds over which children’s time is allocated to certain types of market and domestic production. The 
importance of covariates suggested by these participation conditions on observed child labor decisions are 
estimated in the sample of children from northern Mali in section 6.  
Response to Shocks in Market Production 
The changes in child labor in response to market production shocks are characterized by taking the 




























In response to positive production shocks, households decrease child labor supply to market 
activities. Negative production shocks induce larger allocations of children’s time to income generating or 
subsistence activities. Child and adult productivity shocks have inverse effects on allocation of child time 
to work. This is because the marginal value of children’s labor input increases when less labor is allocated 
to the production process. The responses of both production and health shocks can be tested empirically 
in these data. 
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3.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
Three different econometric specifications are used to investigate allocation of children’s time in home 
production activities such as childcare provision,
5 market activities such as agricultural production and 
family business labor, and school enrollment. Participation in any of these activities is indicated 








ih S , which were derived above. For simplicity, all 




ih L  below. The three econometric 
specifications represent three different sets of identification assumptions about the structure of the 
disturbance term and the inclusion of crop loss shocks and household health shocks.  
Specification 1: Selection into Activities:  Probit with Random Effects 
To estimate the probability of selection into child labor, a probit model is specified for each of the sectors 
independently for which a child works, given household and individual specific covariates (Xi,h), 
community covariates (Zi,h), a household effect on each child ( h c ), and a child/household unobservable 
( , ih ε ), which can be combined in a composite error term:  ,, ih h ih c ν ε = + . The following equation is 





ih ih h ih LX Z β γν =+ +  (16) 
where   ,
C




ih L  > 0  (17) 
         =   0 o t h e r w i s e  
and obtain the distribution of L
C
i, h given X i, h, Z i,h, and ch using the familiar result: 
*
,, , , ( 1 |, , )( 0 |, , )
CC
ih ih h h ih ih h h PL X Z c PL X Z c == > 
  ,, , (| , , ) ih ih h ih h h PX Z X Z c ε βγ => − −  
  ,, 1( ) ( ) ih h ih h X ZX Z β γβ γ =− Φ − − = Φ +  (18) 
where Ф(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Following Butler and Moffitt (1982), 
the conditional likelihood function can be derived to estimate the joint distribution of  ,
C
ih L  conditional on 
, ih X  and h Z , which requires that the random effect is integrated out of the likelihood function.  
The cognitive skills production function (Equation 9) implies that there is an unobservable 
term,θ , that is household-specific and influences children’s learning efficiency. Because this term is 
determined in part from parental involvement in the child’s learning and the child’s genetic and 
psychological disposition to learning, a random effect that potentially varies among children within the 
household seems to correspond closely to the proposed theoretical model. Besides the theoretical 
motivation for investigating household-level effects on children’s work and schooling, there is empirical 
evidence that suggests parental preferences have large effects on children’s schooling decisions. For 
example, 54 percent of children aged 11-17 in Senegal reported that they had not been to school because 
their parents refused to send them, while 19 percent had not attended school because their parents needed 
their help to meet subsistence requirements (Dumas and Lambert 2004). This suggests that household 
preferences may influence children’s time allocation patterns.  
                                                      
5 87 percent of children in our survey reported doing domestic chores, so while this category of work performed by children 
is the highest category in terms of percentage of children participating, estimation of the determinants of this activity is not 
possible given the lack of variation in the dependent variable.   
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Econometrically, there are certain advantages to using probit with random effects to control for 
household unobservables. Maddala (1987) argues that an unobserved household heterogeneous effect,  h c , 
for which there is information and/or some a priori belief that it might not be fixed, ought to be treated 
econometrically as  ih u , in order to measure the household-specific effects about which the 
econometrician is also ignorant. Since fixed effects capture all time-invariant characteristics of the cross-
sectional units, no estimate of the effect of parental education or household assets on child work and 
school participation would be possible.
6  In addition, the household fixed effects estimator suffers from 
the incidental parameters problem, which renders the maximum likelihood estimates inconsistent.  
Random effects estimation is not without innocuous statistical assumptions that require 
consideration. Identification is conditioned on assumptions regarding the relationship between the random 
effect and the covariates and distributional assumptions. Precisely, these assumptions are:  
1.  Strict Exogeneity:   (1 | , ) (1 | , ) ( ) ih i i ih ih i ih i Py xc Py x c x c β == = = Φ +  
2.  1,, ii H y y K are independent, conditional on (,) ii x c  
3. 
2 |( 0 , ) hh c cx N o r m a lσ    
Given a priori beliefs about the nature of the household’s child work and schooling decisions and 
econometric arguments, three econometric specifications are proposed to measure the effects of children’s 
home production, market production, and schooling given household, parental, child-specific and 
community covariates, using household random effects. As a robustness check, the results of the random 
effects and fixed effects estimation at the village level are reported. 
Specification 2:  Investigating the Impact of Agricultural Shocks and Household 
Morbidity 
Building on specification 1, household-reported sicknesses and production shocks that result in crop 
losses that are rated in severity by the farmer (large or small) are included in the second specification. The 
sickness shocks are disaggregated into men’s illness, women’s illness, and children’s illness. Including 





ih ih h ih h ih L X Z Shock c β γφ ε =+ + + +  (19) 
Exogeneity of Shocks 
Self-reported health shocks may not be a reliable measure of health if reporting is correlated with wealth 
and education (Strauss and Thomas 1995). Production shocks also may be endogenous if households’ ex-
ante decisions mitigate the expected risk of seasonal variations. A simple test of the plausibility of the 
shock’s exogeneity estimates the probability that a household reports a shock, controlling for observable 
household characteristics that may likely be correlated with the reporting itself. If these covariates are 
significant determinants of the probability of experiencing a shock, the shock may not be exogenous. The 
following specification is estimated:   
  (1 ) ( , ) hi h h Ps h o c k f X Z = =  (20) 
This exogeneity test examines correlations between household characteristics and self-reported 
morbidity or crop-loss shocks. Using a small subset of panel data for the survey also produces evidence 
regarding the strict exogeneity assumption. The specification below controls for previous shocks to 
illustrate that the effects of self-reported morbidity and crop-loss shocks are transitory. If lagged shocks 
                                                      
6 Several examples of random effects estimation in the children’s health and education literature include Pitt (1997), Glick 
and Sahn (1999, 2005), or Paxson and Schady (2005).  
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have persistent effects on the dependent variable, then the strict exogeneity assumption on which the 
random effects estimate depends would be questionable. Equation 21 includes controls for time-invariant 
household and community characteristics and includes household fixed effects. 
 
*
, ,2006 , 2006 , ,2006 1997 , ,1997 ,
C
ih ih h ih ih ih L X Z Shock Shock β γφ φ ε =+ + + +  (21) 
Smoothing Shocks:  The Role of Assets 
Several categories of assets, including the values of the household’s durable goods, agricultural capital, 
and livestock, are of particular interest because of their varying liquidity. Faced with production and 
health shocks, households may choose to liquidate assets rather than change the allocation of children’s 
time. These shocks are interacted with the asset types in the probit model such that Equation 19 becomes:  
 
*
,, , , , , ()
C
ih ih h ih ih ih h ih L X Z Shock Shock Assets c β βγγφ α ε =+ + + ⋅ + +  (22) 
Specification Three:  Multivariate Probit 
The previous econometric specifications treated the dependent variables as independent decisions in an 
equation-by-equation specification. However, the theoretical modeling suggests that cross-equation 
correlation is likely. These cross-equation correlations can be modeled by using a multivariate probit 
model such that:  
*
1, , , 1 ; ,
C
ih ih h ih ih S X Z Shock β γφ ε =+ + +  
*
2, , , 2 ; ,
C
ih ih h ih ih L X Z Shock β γφ ε =+ + +  
*
3, , , 3 ; ,
C
ih ih h ih ih L X Z Shock β γφ ε =+ + +  
*
4, , , 4 ; ,
C
ih ih h ih ih L X Z Shock β γφ ε =+ + +  (23) 




mi h L , m=1,2,3,4, represents an activity for which a child may 





ih S  is defined as the discrete choice of whether the child was withdrawn from school in the 
previous year. Conditional on the child having been enrolled in school the previous year, the 
interpretation of the shock variables are cleanly identified. The relevant question is whether production 
and health shocks are causing students to withdraw from school. School enrollment for children not 
enrolled in school during the last academic year will be unaffected by shocks in the same year.    
Restrictions on the residuals,  ;, mih ε  require:  
;, , (| , ) 0 mih ih h EX Z ε =  
,, , [| , ] 1 mih ih h Var X Z ε =  
;, 1 ;, , [, |, ] mih m ih ih h Cov X Z ε ερ + =  where  jkk j ρ ρ =  (24) 
Using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, the system of equations in (24) can be 
estimated by evaluating the four-dimensional normal integrals in a likelihood function (Geweke et al. 
1994).  
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4.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
The Survey Area:  Northern Mali 
The regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal lie in the arid and semi-arid regions of northern Mali. The 
most southwesterly communes of the region of Tombouctou are located in the inner Niger Delta, where 
the Niger River breaks into multiple streams to irrigate small ponds and lakes that supply water to 
otherwise parched soils that are increasingly sandy from the climactic forces of desertification. The 
defining geographic feature of this region is the juxtaposition between the vast and desolate Saharan 
desert and the third largest river in Africa, the Niger, which meanders northeasterly until it reaches its 
most northern point in the commune of Bourem before descending past the ancient city of Gao into the 
country of Niger. Besides providing the primary water source in an otherwise arid zone, the Niger River 
is a primary transportation route, enables fishing for food and the cultivation of floating rice, and provides 
grasses called bourgou (Echinochloa stignina) for the alimentation of livestock.  
Rainfall in the three regions is scarce and intermittent during the rainy season which is generally 
considered to span July to September. The Saharan zone (desert or arid regions) receives less than 150 
millimeters of rainfall per year. This varies starkly with the Sahelien zone (grassland or semi-arid 
regions), which receives 200-600 millimeters per year, and the south of Mali, which can receive between 
600 and 1200 millimeters per year (Christiaensen 1998). Depending on the date of planting, the primary 
harvest begins in October and could last into December or early January. Grains, particularly rice, 
sorghum, and millet are the primary crops cultivated. December and January are the coldest periods, 
which lead to the hot and hunger seasons that span from February to June. During this period, a limited 
number of counter-seasonal crops are produced, but these are cultivated mostly from smaller garden plots 
than from the larger plots used for grain cultivation during the primary agricultural season. The school 
year usually begins in September and ends in June, leaving children available for planting, but potentially 
occupied with schooling during the harvest season. Rainfall scarcity is counterbalanced by irrigation from 
the Niger River and lake recession agriculture in the inner Niger delta. The source of the Niger River, 
Tembakounda, lies in the Djallon Mountains of Guinea, where rainfall is siphoned into the river, 
determining its volume for the most part.
7  But after the rainy season in the mountains ends, river levels 
diminish, exacerbating water scarcity in northern Mali. As a result, primary and secondary tributaries 
along the river’s primary bed dry up completely.  
Seventy-three percent of households in our survey participate in agriculture as a primary activity. 
Primary activities are predominantly determined by ethnicity, with the Sonray, Soninké, and Bambara 
being the primary cultivators; the Peuhl, Tamasheq, Berabich, and Maures the traditional pastoralists; and 
the Sorko, Korongoy, and the Bozo deriving their livelihood from fishing. However, there is idiosyncratic 
variation across communities, most notably among selected Tamasheqs, who, after the Touareg rebellion 
of 1990-96, increasingly have become more sedentary as part of governmental and nongovernmental 
interventions.  
Poverty is a widespread phenomenon in Mali, but specifically in the rural regions of northern 
Mali. The region has known several significant economic shocks, including widespread drought and 
famine in 1914, 1973, and 1984, as well as the civil conflict noted above in the early 1990s. The 
Government of Mali’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002 reports a national poverty rate of 63.8 
percent, with severe poverty in the country at the 21 percent level. Indicators from the Rapport National 
2003 sur le développement humain durable au Mali (RNDH 2003) illustrate the entrenchment of rural 
poverty at the communal level in the north, as compared to other regions of Mali. Because northern Mali 
                                                      
7 Christiaensen (1998) provides a detailed description of river levels and rainfall data that illustrates this relationship. In 
particular, this is why rainfall data is unlikely to be correlated with production yields.  According to the EPSANM 2006, 22 
percent of farmers use irrigation drawn from the Niger River (Dillon 2006). The timing and levels of this flooding and water 
recession are the critical covariates in these production systems. They determine water availability and thus agricultural income, 
not local rainfall.   
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is geographically isolated and considered to have less potential than other regions of Mali, differences in 
public investment are stark.
8   According to the 2003 Rapport National, 33 percent of communes in 
Tombouctou, 30 percent in Kidal, and 35 percent in Gao had no access to primary schools in 1998. Other 
regions further south and west of these northern regions had far lower percentages of communes without 
access: Kayes (13 percent), Koulikoro (1 percent), Sikasso (6 percent), Segou (4 percent), and Mopti (7 
percent).  
Survey Design  
The data for this paper were collected as part of the Etude sur la Pauvreté et la Sécurité Alimentaire au 
Nord Mali (EPSANM) 2006. This multi-topic household survey was implemented to study household 
behavior related to human capital formation and household production activities, including agriculture, 
herding, and nonfarm activities in northern Mali. A representative household survey of 2,155 households 
in 151 villages was undertaken from February 2006 to October 2006 in seven cercles or states (Niafunke, 
Goundam, Dire, Tombouctou, Rharous, Bourem, and Kidal) in the regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and 
Kidal. Households were drawn randomly using a two-stage cluster sample. Detailed documentation of the 
survey design and methodology can be found in Dillon (2006).  
The data set is composed of a village questionnaire and a tripartite household questionnaire. The 
village questionnaire was administered to village leaders in each village or town covered by the study. 
The household questionnaire comprised modules for an adult male, adult female, and child. Survey 
modules concerning the household’s composition, education, primary activities, migration, and history of 
positive and negative shocks were addressed to the household head, usually a man. Questions concerning 
the household’s food consumption, health, and dietary diversity were addressed to women. Sections 
concerning possessions, nonfood expenditures, agricultural production, herding activities, credit, and time 
allocation were addressed to both men and women. The children’s modules were addressed to children 
aged 10-17 years old with questions about their participation in multiple household and market 
production activities and schooling, the hours worked during the past week in these activities, and the 
time spent on a set of activities in order to determine the distribution of time amongst work, school, and 
leisure. A second section of questions collected more detailed schooling information for all children 
enrolled in school.  
 
                                                      
8 The concept of Le Mali inutile became a popular characterization of northern Mali, which was considered useless due to 
low production possibilities as deemed by USAID and the World Bank, especially after the 1974 droughts.  See Poulton and ag 
Youssouf (1998) for a detailed recent history of northern Mali.     
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5.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Children’s participation rates in schooling, home production, and market-oriented production are 
summarized in Table B.1
9. Thirty-three percent of children in our survey are currently in school, the 
lowest percentage of any category of activity. Another indicator of children’s schooling status is whether 
children were withdrawn from school in the last academic year. Of students who were enrolled, 18 
percent were withdrawn. Most children (87 percent) do some household work, while 45 percent are 
responsible for watching other children within the family. Market-oriented productive activities also have 
high child participation rates, with farm work occupying 54 percent of children in the survey and work in 
the family business
10 occupying almost 68 percent. Children’s joint production activities are also 
summarized in Table B.1. Twenty-five percent of children combine some market work with school. 
Twenty-eight percent combine domestic work with school, while only 20 percent of children perform 
some market work and domestic work.  
Northern Mali’s child labor rates are higher than regional means. The ILO estimates that 26.4 
percent of children in Sub-Saharan Africa performed some type of economic activity in 2004 (ILO 2006). 
Within West Africa, Dumas and Lambert (2004) report that of children aged 11-17 in Senegal, 67 percent 
attended school, 69 percent reported participating in domestic work, and 25 percent participated in non-
domestic work.
11   Higher mean participation rates in work activities and lower schooling rates may 
reflect higher poverty levels and less public infrastructure in northern Mali relative to other African 
countries. While Sub-Saharan African children have the highest incidence rates of economic activity, 
Asian children have the largest absolute number of economically active children, according to the ILO.    
Table B.2 presents disaggregated children’s participation rates across activities by sex and 
urban/rural area. Girls bear most of the responsibility for domestic work as defined by both watching 
other children in the household and doing domestic chores. A higher percentage of urban girls than rural 
girls participate in domestic work, although the differences between participation rates is most striking for 
domestic childcare that girls provide to the family. Forty-nine percent of rural girls watch other children 
in the family, while 74 percent of urban girls do so. The distinction between urban and rural boys is also 
wide with 36 percent of rural boys and 61 percent or urban boys being responsible for watching other 
children. Ninety percent of urban boys also do some sort of domestic chores, whereas 79 percent of rural 
boys do so. Rates of participation in domestic chores for girls are high in both urban and rural areas, with 
rates of 97 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Studies from Ghana, such as Bhalotra and Heady (2003), 
report rural school participation rates for girls and boys at 68.9 percent and 76.5 percent; farm work at 
34.4 percent and 40.5 percent; and joint participation in school and farm work at 29.9 percent and 24.6 
percent, respectively
12. 
Work in the family business does not differ with respect to urban and rural areas. However, 
participation in the family business differs between girls and boys by a rate of almost 11 percent. Another 
market-oriented activity, farm work, shows distinct rural/urban and boy/girl differences. Rural boys and 
urban boys farm with rates of participation of 73 percent and 50 percent, respectively, whereas only 38 
percent of rural girls and 23 percent of urban girls work on the farm. With regard to children’s 
participation in schooling, rates of schooling differ across rural and urban areas, but they are similar 
between girls and boys. Forth-six percent of urban children go to school while only 32 percent of rural 
children are currently being schooled. Girl and boy school participation rates differ by only 2 percent, 
with boys favored slightly.  
                                                      
9 The percentage of idle children in our survey is only 2 percent. That is, children who neither work nor go to school.   
10 In northern Mali, family businesses are primarily run by women who have small enterprises, usually manufacturing 
condiments for food, artisanal goods, or housewares such as mats or kitchen tools. Products are sold on weekly market days as a 
supplement to household income.  
11 L’Enquete Education et Bien-Etre des Menages au Senegal 2003 investigates multiple types of children’s domestic and 
market-oriented activities (Dumas and Lambert 2004), suggesting that these results are a good comparison for EPSNAM 2006.  
12 Bhalotra and Heady (2003) use the rural sample from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 1991/92 for children aged 7-14.   
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Summary statistics of the child, parental, and household characteristics are summarized in Table 
B.3. Boys comprise 54.5 percent of the children in the sample.
13  The distribution of ages, restricted to 
children between 10 and 17 years old, is presented as indicator variables of each age reported from the 
household roster. Because official administrative record-keeping has only recently become common at the 
commune level in Mali and a high percentage of natural births outside of hospitals are common, correct 
reporting of a child’s age can be difficult. There seems to be some grouping of children’s ages around 
even numbers (10, 12, 14, and 16 year olds), with odd ages reporting lower numbers. There is no 
particular natural phenomenon that could explain this pattern, so the interpretation of age-specific results 
should be conducted with caution in light of potential measurement error in the age variable. In addition 
to age, sex, and ethnicity, the child’s relationship to the head of household is reported. The household 
head is plausibly the primary decisionmaker whose influence on the child’s work and schooling may in 
part be dictated by social relationships. Eighty percent of children are the biological offspring of the head 
of household.  
Household composition is potentially a critical determinant of children’s schooling and work 
activities. The number of household members may determine total labor availability to allocate to various 
market and domestic activities. The mean number of boys is 1.7, girls 1.4, women 1.7 and men 1.6.
14   
Adult characteristics such as the ages of the household head and spouse are also included in the 
econometric analysis. These variables capture potential life-cycle influences of the primary 
decisionmakers who influence children’s time allocation. The household’s human capital is measured by 
parental education. Education is measured as an indicator variable of the parent ever having completed a 
grade level of education. Only 5 percent of mothers have any education whereas fathers have an 
education rate of 10 percent.
15     
Household assets and unearned income are reported in the second column of Table B.3. Four 
types of assets are reported:  herd size, herd value, agricultural capital value, and household durables 
value.
16  Herd size captures the number of animals that require supervision, resulting in higher child labor 
demand. However, herd value captures the value of animals as an asset. Hence, households may choose to 
store their wealth in fewer, high-value animals that are less liquid, or a larger number of low-value 
animals. Households have a mean of 19.25 animals with a value of 532,000 FCFA, slightly more than 
US$ 1,000. Agricultural capital had much lower mean household value, less than US$ 100, or 47,000 
FCFA. Durable goods, which include furniture, radios, motorcycles, and other house wares, had a mean 
value of 303,000 FCFA, or less than US$ 600. These assets represent varying levels of liquidity, which 
may affect whether households choose them to smooth consumption or choose instead to increase 
children’s work. A primary component of unearned income is captured by migrant remittances that have a 
mean value of 40,508 FCFA, but with a high standard deviation across households.  
The incidence of household shocks is summarized in Tables A2.3 and A2.6. Twenty-five percent 
of households reported a large crop shock caused by insects or birds eating pre-harvest crops, a common 
problem in northern Mali over which farmers have limited control. Fifty-three percent of farmers reported 
no crop losses, while another 22 percent reported only minor crop losses. Households also reported which 
members had been sick in the previous month. Adult males had an illness incidence rate of 13 percent. 
                                                      
13 This deviation from proximate parity in the sex ratio suggests that girls and boys may have characteristics which 
systematically differ, causing higher migration out of northern Mali or higher mortality rates. The assumption of pooling both 
genders will be relaxed in the forthcoming econometric investigation to test this proposition.  
14 Adults include any person aged 18 or older in the household. This may not necessarily be congruent with the social 
conception of how households themselves may view members, since persons aren’t usually considered adults until after marriage. 
However, for the purposes of investigating work, persons aged 18 have reached full physical development and are usually out of 
school to be freely allocated to different activities. Children aged 17 or under may still be developing and/or have obligations to 
school, which may differentially impact their time allocation.  
15 Parental education is potentially endogenous, but we have no plausible instruments, such as grandparent’s education, to 
identify this relationship. The schooling participation of grandparents reported in the study is close to zero. Concerns about this 
source of potential endogeneity may be assuaged by the low incidence of parental education in these data.  
16 The value of all assets is reported in local currency, the CFA Franc (FCFA). During the period of the survey, US$ 1 = 515 
FCFA approximately.   
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Twenty-one percent of women reported that they were sick in the previous month, while 14 percent of 
children were reported to have been sick. The distribution of these shocks across the regions studied also 
provides evidence of the variability of their incidence in different zones. Table B.6 shows that the 
incidence rates of large crop losses by cercle are highest in Rharous, Bourem, and Niafunke, with 
Rharous being particularly hard hit by crop losses in the last agricultural season.
17  The rates of male, 
female, and child sickness display a different regional distribution than the production shocks. The 
highest rates of male illness rates come from Rharous, Tombouctou, and Dire, while female illness rates 
are highest in Bourem, Tombouctou, and Dire. Children’s illness rates are highest in Bourem, Rharous, 
and Tombouctou. 
There are two types of community characteristics that are also included in the econometric 
specifications:  characteristics that proxy for market development and the potential of children’s work 
opportunities and school quality, and characteristics that increase the efficiency of children’s learning, 
i.e., the cognitive skills attained per unit of time spent in school (Table B.5). Table B.4 presents the 
community characteristics that include whether the child comes from an urban or rural area, a regional 
indicator, and variables indicating whether the child’s village or town has access to the Niger River or an 
improved road. Access to either the river or an improved road increases the commercial potential of a 
village or town because transportation and communication links increase. Commune-level data is also 
collected to indicate the size of potential markets as a function of the commune’s total population and the 
concentration of this population by the number of villages per commune. These community 
characteristics may have alternative effects on the allocation of children’s time across different activities. 
Greater access to income-generating activities may increase the child’s market-oriented work as 
households struggle to meet subsistence requirements. Alternatively, access to income-generating 
activities may cause adults to work more, decreasing children’s market-oriented work, but increasing their 
domestic work as adults leave the household to pursue income opportunities. Exactly how these income 
and substitution effects, both on children and adults, affect the allocation of children’s time to different 
activities is an empirical question.  
 
                                                      
17 Despite the high incidence rates in Bourem, only 7 percent of the villages surveyed come from this area, reflecting 
perhaps a more isolated incident than the percentage of households affected may seem to indicate if the sample were evenly 
distributed across the cercles.   
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6.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The effects of household characteristics—assets and household composition, parental and child 
characteristics, community characteristics such as school quality, and crop and health shocks—on 
participation across schooling, home production, and market-oriented production
18 are presented in this 
section. All reported coefficients in the tables are marginal effects.  
Probit Model with Random Effects
19 
Table C.1 presents the results from the random effects model.
20  Gender has significant impacts on the 
selection of children into farm work, the family business, and child care. Joint production of market work 
and schooling also becomes significant at the 10 percent level after controlling for random effects. Boys 
are more likely to engage in farm work and joint production of market work and schooling. However, 
boys are less likely to engage in work in the family business and child care activities. As expected, age 
effects are positive for schooling at age 11 and negative for older children (16 and 17 year olds).  
Household characteristics and composition are also important determinants of children’s 
participation in work and schooling activities.
21  Controlling for random effects, the probability of being 
selected into schooling increases by .282 for biological children,
22 indicating that foster or adopted 
children may not receive the same investments in human capital. The number of boys, girls, and adults in 
the household determines the household’s labor availability. The higher the number of girls, the lower the 
probability that they will be selected for farm work, but the higher the probability that they will be 
selected for childcare. An increase in the number of boys also increases the probability that a child will be 
selected into childcare. Higher numbers of adult men in the household lower selection of children into all 
work activities and schooling except farm work, while higher numbers of adult women lowers child 
selection into childcare.  
Household assets are less important factors of selection into children’s work and schooling 
activities. For selection into schooling, herd value positively affects schooling participation, while herd 
size negatively affects it. These marginal effects suggest that while livestock form assets that correlate 
positively with children’s schooling, they require constant supervision, a task that may be delegated to 
children. Hence, livestock holdings influence the internal mechanisms of household labor supply and 
demand.  
Parental education has large and significant effects on children’s work and schooling. Children of 
educated fathers have higher selection probabilities into schooling and lower selection probabilities into 
the family business and joint market and home production. However, children of educated fathers face 
higher selection probabilities for the other two joint production variables. Mother’s education has 
significant effects for all activities except farming. This suggests that educated parents may have 
increased income-generating opportunities that require not only additional labor from their children in 
                                                      
18 The outcome variables we consider include indicators for school, farm work, working in the family business, domestic 
work, watching other children, and three joint-production categories:  market production and school, home production and 
school, and market production and home production. Full regression results are presented in Appendix 3:  Tables A3.1-A3.7.  
19 Probit model regression results without random effects are displayed in Table A3.8. Their discussion is excluded here for 
brevity.  
20 The domestic work equation has been dropped because its high positive response rate made the random effects estimation 
unable to converge.  
21 The number of children within the household and whether the child is fostered into the household may be endogenous, 
even controlling for household random effects. We relax this assumption later and perform a robustness check on the stability of 
the coefficients without these variables included in the regression.  
22 This suggests that foster or adopted children may not receive uniform investments in human capital, but the causality may 
not be directly related to foster parents. If birth parents have already withheld children from enrolling in school, it may be 
prohibitively costly or impossible for foster parents to reverse this decision. See for example, Akresh (2007a and 2007b) on the 
decision to foster and the impact of foster on children’s schooling.  
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market-oriented activities, but also in home production. This hypothesis is reinforced by the finding that 
children of educated mothers have higher selection probabilities into joint production.    
Examining the commune-level demographic and school characteristics data, the presence of a 
primary school in a village increases the probability that a child is selected into schooling. In the random 
effects specification, the presence of a high school also increases this probability. The latter may reflect 
parents’ expectations that having their child finish high school would provide a higher return than 
stopping at primary education. The presence of a primary school also increases participation in joint 
production, both market-oriented and home production with schooling, as well as in domestic work and 
family business work. The latter two are time-insensitive activities that can accommodate schedules 
outside of school hours. School quality characteristics also influence selection into school. For example, 
an increased student teacher ratio in primary schools lowers selection into schools by .014.  
Impact of Health and Crop Loss Shocks on Children’s Work and Schooling 
Before estimating the effects of production and morbidity shocks on child labor and schooling variables, 
the exogeneity test described by Equation 22 was conducted. Table C.2 reports these results. The 
probability that a production or morbidity shock was reported does not increase with parental education in 
this sample. Reporting of large production shocks actually decreases with parental education by 8 percent 
for mothers and 6 percent for fathers. Some asset variables are correlated with production shocks and 
male morbidity. However, all but one of the four significant results is positive. Within this sample, there 
is not a strong argument for the endogenity of these reported shocks based on observable household 
characteristics.  
Controlling for random effects, the effects of shocks are statistically significant for agricultural 
shocks and health shocks to women making participation decisions across schooling and work activities. 
Table C.3 presents the results of the probit model with random effects and shocks. Large and small crop 
shocks induce higher participation by children in farm work. Both types of crop shocks decrease the 
probability of working in the family business, with large crop losses having much larger magnitudes than 
small crop losses. Large crop losses also significantly decrease children’s participation in school, 
providing childcare to other children, and the joint production of market and schooling activities and of 
home production and schooling activities. Small crop losses increase children’s childcare to other children 
in the household, but the effect is opposite for large crop losses. This may confirm the hypothesis that 
adults when fully occupied responding to smaller crop losses, leave children to increasingly care for 
themselves in these minor crises. However, as the magnitude of the shock increases, the household may 
be forced to mobilize all available labor to either salvage a harvest quickly or replant before the rainy 
season passes completely.  
Health shocks to women have large substitution effects on the participation of children across 
school and work. A sick adult women in the household increases the probability that a child will be 
withdrawn from school by .73. Female illness also increases the probability that a child will work in the 
family business, which women mostly supervise, and that a child will provide more childcare. These 
results suggest that children are substitutes for women when female labor supply is reduced in the 
household.  
Shock-Asset Interactions with Random Effects 
Tables A3.4 and A3.5 present the results that investigate the role of assets in mitigating shocks, 
controlling for random effects. The value of asset stocks have significant effects when interacted with 
crop shocks. Agricultural capital interacted with the large crop loss shock lowers the selection of children 
into childcare or into the joint production of market and home production with schooling. Livestock 
values interacted with small crop losses increase child participation in joint market production and  
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schooling. This household response may be motivated by coping strategies that rely on increasing market 
production to compensate for income shortfalls from small production shocks. 
Assets are also fundamental to the household’s ex-post response to health shocks. Durables stocks 
decrease the probability that a child works on the farm in response to the sickness of an adult male in the 
household. Durables also decrease selection into childcare and the joint activities of market and home 
production. When adult men fall ill, livestock values interacted with the shocks increase child 
participation in farming, childcare, and joint market and home production. When adult females fall ill, 
livestock values interacted with the shock increase participation in joint home production and schooling. 
This suggests that child labor and some asset types may be complementary, in contrast to the literature on 
consumption smoothing, which suggests assets help insure households against falling into poverty. While 
this may be true in the short term, if shocks induce households to withdraw children from school and 
assets provide no insurance against this response to shocks, lower human capital of children may lead to 
increased levels of future poverty.  When adults fall ill, assets, specifically durables, are the only types of 
assets that insure children against higher participation in market and home production activities.  
Verifying the Assumptions of the Random Effects Estimator 
The assumptions of strict exogeneity, independence of dependent variables conditioned on the 
unobservable effect and independent variables, and independence of the independent variables and the 
unobservable effect are strong. But these assumptions are necessary given the extensive literature that 
suggests that household effects such as parental education and assets influence child labor and schooling 
participation. While likelihood ratio tests that the unobserved effect is absent were rejected in all 
equations at the 5 percent significance level, this only confirms the presence of an unobservable, not the 
conditions under which it can consistently estimate the parameters.    
Using a small subset of child panel data with observations from 1997 and 2006, estimates of 
Equation 23 are reported in Table C.6. While sickness data for all household members from 1997 is not 
available, crop loss shock data is available. If strict exogeneity is violated, coefficients from crop loss 
shocks in 1997 should have significant effects. However, this is not the case in the data. Asset-shock 
interactions for 1997 are also not significant in regression results. While this evidence supports the strict 
exogeneity hypothesis, the absence of significant effects may be due to the relatively small sample size 
rather than the actual absence of a lagged effect.  
To provide additional evidence for the strict exogeneity hypothesis, the sample was disaggregated 
according to younger (ages 10-13) and older (ages 14-17) cohorts using the full cross-section. If strict 
exogeneity is violated, there should be distinct differences in parameter estimates for asset stocks and 
household composition variables if changes in these variables in subsequent periods have persistent 
effects on current child time allocation. Presumably, the older cohort would have been exposed to more of 
these lagged changes, which would result in systematic differences between the two cohorts. However, 
this pattern does not appear in the sample
23. Parameter estimates, especially for assets, have small 
differences in magnitude and do not differ in significance across cohorts.  
Pooling Child Labor and Schooling Equations by Gender 
Given the importance of gender in our initial estimates of child labor and schooling, the sample was 
disaggregated to evaluate differences in parameter estimates by gender and the pooling of girls and boys. 
These results are presented in Table C.7. Differences between boys and girls are most pronounced in the 
schooling participation equation. Girls that are biological children of the head of household are 50 percent 
more likely to attend school than girls who are not biological children. Asset values measured either by 
livestock value or durable goods increase boys’ school participation by 5-6 percent per increase of 100 
000 FCFA, while assets have no effect on girls’ schooling. Parental education also has differential 
                                                      
23 These regression results are available on request, but are suppressed for brevity.   
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impacts on girls and boys. Any mother’s education increases by 69 percent the selection probability on 
boys’ schooling than for girls’ schooling. Any father’s education has a 53 percent greater impact on girls. 
Despite these differences in magnitude, having either an educated mother or father greatly increases the 
child’s probability of attending school.  
Robustness Check:  Family Composition 
Because of additions of new family members either through fostering or new child births, family 
composition variables should be considered endogenous in a structural model of household 
decisionmaking. These data do not contain plausible instruments to correct for the possible correlation 
between family composition variables and unobservables. To test whether this potential endogeneity 
affects parameter estimates, the previous probit model with household level random effects is re-
estimated by omitting various combinations of the family composition variables to test the stability of the 
parameters
24. The parameters of assets, parental education, gender, age effects, and community 
characteristics are stable across various combinations of assumptions about the family composition 
variables. All variables that had previously been significant remained significant with parameter estimates 
that were within reasonable levels of variation.  
Controlling for Village-Level Fixed and Random Effects 
An alternative to the household level random effects model previously estimated is to assume that there 
are no household-level effects, but only village-level effects that influence child time allocation. These 
village effects could be social norms or political influence. Social norms may affect whether children are 
encouraged to go to school as a result of the village overriding parental preferences that may differ with 
the norm.  Political influence may determine whether the village is able to attract public investment such 
as schools, roads, or market location, which affects children’s opportunity costs of attending school and 
working.  
Table C.8 presents the results under the assumption of no village effects, village fixed effects, and 
village random effects. There are differences in both parameter estimates and the significance of 
parameters under these three assumptions. This suggests that appropriately specifying the equation of 
interest is quite important to the empirical results. Regardless of specification, gender is a significant 
determinant of participation with similar signs across the specifications, but different parameter estimates. 
The number of adult men is significant under the random effects specification for schooling, while under 
the fixed effects specification the number of adult men is significant in the farm equation. Village random 
effects also suggest significance at the 1 percent level for mother’s and father’s education, whereas fixed 
effects only capture a significant effect for father’s education. The parameter estimates in the fixed effects 
specification are also quite similar to the no effects specification. The village random effects specification 
yields parameter estimates that are approximately three times as large as the fixed effects estimates for 
parental education.  
The Multivariate Probit Model 
The final econometric specification to be estimated controls for cross-equation correlations using a 
multivariate probit model (Table C.9). Parameter estimates are generally smaller than in the household-
level random effects specification, but patterns of significance among the covariates are similar. One 
notable exception is mother’s education, which is significant in the household level random effects 
specification, but insignificant under the multivariate probit. Migrant remittances have negative effects on 
the probability that a child participates in farm work, which is not captured in the random effects 
specification.  
                                                      
24 These regression results are available on request, but omitted for brevity.   
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The results of the shock estimates (Table C.3) under the multivariate probit model are quite 
similar to the estimates from the household random effects model. The parameter estimates are lower, but 
the patterns of significance remain constant. Of particular interest is the change in the child’s participation 
in the family business in response to large crop loss shocks. The parameter estimate is almost four times 
less under the multivariate probit specification. Tables A3.10 and A3.11 present the results for the asset-
shock interactions. These results differ significantly from the household-level random effects 
specification. For the crop loss shocks, durables have a duplicitous role depending on the magnitude of 
the shock. Interactions with large crop loss shocks have significant and negative impacts on the child’s 
selection into the family business. Durable-small crop loss shock interactions raise the probability that a 
child will work in the family business. Livestock values interacted with large crop shocks lower the 
probability a child is withdrawn from school, suggesting that assets that are more liquid may serve as an 
alternative to changes in children’s time allocation in response to crop shocks. In response to adult 
sicknesses, durables lower the probability that children are withdrawn from school when men are sick and 
the probability children work in the family business when women are sick. Livestock values have 
opposite effects on the probability a child is withdrawn from school when adults are sick. When men are 
sick, increased livestock value increases the probability a child is withdrawn from school, reflecting the 
increased labor demand to care for animals. When women are sick, increased livestock value lowers the 
probability a child is withdrawn from school.   
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7.  CONCLUSION 
Understanding the mechanisms by which children’s time is allocated to school, home production, and 
market production is fundamental to the development of a broader economics of children and the 
competing opportunity costs of their time. Children conduct multiple domestic and market-oriented 
production activities for their households. These activities directly contribute to income generation or free 
other household members to conduct renumerative activities. Most children in the world who work 
contribute to household income or to meeting subsistence needs without being employed in the worst 
forms of child labor. However, participation in work outside of the worst forms can have differential 
effects; etiher increasing children’s human capital from increased work experience or limiting their total 
time in school or the quality of schooling due to work requirements. Our understanding of child 
participation in market and domestic activities and these welfare effects are relatively underdeveloped 
compared to adult labor supply.  
The model of children’s work and schooling that is developed in Section 2 of this paper explains 
selection into different activities based on the shadow value of a child’s time. In the econometric 
specifications, proxies for the myriad of factors that may alter the value of the child’s shadow wage 
include household composition, labor market opportunities represented by demographic variables, and 
school quality characteristics. Household composition and asset values, specifically livestock values, 
influence selection into work and schooling. Despite low incidences of formal education in northern Mali, 
father’s and mother’s education have large, significant point estimates. Proximity to school influences 
selection into school under all of our econometric specifications.  
The importance of shocks on child welfare cannot be underestimated. While substitution into and 
out of market and domestic work is relatively innocuous, save the impact of the additional hours, 
substitution out of schooling has relatively long-term welfare consequences for the production of human 
capital. Children, once withdrawn from school, may have difficulty returning even after a few months of 
absence. To recuperate the loss of schooling time, children may have to completely repeat grade levels. 
This “ratchet” effect, that is, the shock’s role of completely halting the process of human capital 
accumulation, holds more serious welfare implications than moving into or out of work activities. From a 
policy perspective, constructing insurance schemes to protect households against shocks have 
implications not only for household consumption, but also for children’s work and schooling. In addition, 
these results illustrate that when women fall ill, children are substitutes for their home and market 
production. Investing in women’s health care may have the secondary benefits of lifting households out of 
long-term poverty because children’s schooling would not be reduced as often by immediate household 
labor demands.  
As documented in the literature by such papers as Beegle et al. (2006), assets play a substantial 
role in protecting children from the negative effects of shocks. This paper provides additional support for 
this empirical finding with one important caveat:  types of assets may differ in providing insurance 
against shocks. Not only does the type of shock matter (income or labor productivity shock), but so does 
the question of whether the asset in question is complementary to child labor or a substitute for it. These 
results show that increasing assets such as livestock may have differential effects on child labor and 
schooling, depending on type of shock and who it affects within the household. However, household 
durables do insure children against adult illness and to a lesser extent, production shocks. More research 
to understand the interactions between asset types and the impact of shocks on child labor and schooling 
can improve interventions targeted at households that live in risky environments in order to reduce 
poverty in the long term by keeping children in school.    
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APPENDIX A:  MODEL 
To summarize the household’s problem, the parents must choose the following variables for the 
respective period: 
  Period 1:    n 




A T T , ,,,
FHS
CCC TTT , s , k  
The household’s problem can be reduced in complexity by substitution of the home and market 
production equations (4 and 5) into the second period budget constraint. Equations 2 and 3 can be 
substituted into the monotonically increasing utility function as it will bind at the optimum. The cognitive 
skills production function (Equation 7) can be substituted in Equation 6, the period 3 income of the child, 
which can directly replace its argument in the utility function. After these substitutions, the household’s 
problem reduces to a three equation system with a utility function and two time constraints (adult and 
child):   
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(A.3) 
The Lagrangian function can be written as follows after which the first order conditions are as follows:  
£ = U + λ1  2 () ( )
FHSL FHL
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(A.4) 
FOC (if λ1, λ2 > 0) 
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Equations A.5-A.11 characterize the allocation of the household’s optimal number of children, 
the distribution of adult and child time across activities, the child’s period 2 consumption and the 
allocation of assets for period 3 adult consumption. The household’s decisions are examined given these 
first order conditions, including the optimal number of children and child participation in schooling, 
domestic production, and market production.  
Fertility Conditions 
Rearranging Equation A.5 yields the condition by which the household chooses its optimal number of 
children, n*. For each additional child, the income equivalent of an additional child is equated to the 
marginal cost of the child. The cost of each additional child includes period 1 costs, b, of the child’s birth 
and early child care costs including medical care, clothes, period 1 consumption, period 2 consumption, 















APPENDIX B:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table B.1.  Participation by activity, children 10-17 years 
   Mean  Std. Err. 
Participation by Activity    
Child Care  0.449  0.016 
Domestic Chores  0.870  0.010 
Work in the Family Business  0.677  0.015 
Farm Work  0.542  0.015 
School 0.334  0.015 
Child Care + Domestic Chores  0.880  0.010 
Family Business + Farm Work  0.845  0.011 
Joint Production    
Market Work + School  0.247  0.014 
Domestic Work + School  0.278  0.014 
Market Work + Homework  0.204  0.013 
Changes in Child’s School Enrollment    
Withdrawn from School in the Last Year (N=786)  0.179  0.019 
Notes:  For all variables, N=1920, except Withdrawn from School (N=786). 
Withdrawn from school last year is conditional on the child having been enrolled in the previous school year. 
Discrete variables, domestic work and market work, are aggregated from children’s activities: Market Work = Family Business + 
Farm Work and Domestic Work= Child Care + Domestic Chores. 
All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors are corrected for clustering. 
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Table B.2.  Participation rates of boys and girls (10-17 years) in rural and urban areas 
Activity 
  Rural  Urban  Girls  Boys  Rural Girl Urban Girl  Rural Boy Urban Boy
          
Mean  0.4164 0.6698 0.5219 0.3871 0.4893 0.7398 0.3559 0.6082 
Child Care 
Std.  Error  0.0483 0.0715 0.0526 0.0466 0.0560 0.0603 0.0477 0.0845 
          
Mean  0.8600 0.9352 0.9531 0.7997 0.9501 0.9730 0.7853 0.9019 
Domestic Work 
Std.  Error  0.0242 0.0342 0.0122 0.0330 0.0136 0.0130 0.0357 0.0568 
          
Mean  0.6747 0.6813 0.7325 0.6278 0.7366 0.7051 0.6232 0.6603 
Work in the Family 
Business 
Std.  Error  0.0440 0.0722 0.0367 0.0450 0.0413 0.0576 0.0498 0.0855 
          
Mean  0.5687 0.3706 0.3565 0.7001 0.3762 0.2254 0.7285 0.4984 
Farm Work 
Std.  Error  0.0285 0.0827 0.0418 0.0316 0.0434 0.0927 0.0311 0.0778 
          
Mean  0.3177 0.4619 0.3233 0.3465 0.3117 0.4009 0.3227 0.5157 
School 
Std.  Error  0.0405 0.0530 0.0410 0.0395 0.0464 0.0700 0.0445 0.0446 
Joint Production            
          
Mean  0.2390 0.3029 0.2162 0.2729 0.2135 0.2345 0.2602 0.3631 
Market Activities 
and School 
Std.  Error  0.0343 0.0365 0.0381 0.0336 0.0435 0.0412 0.0380 0.0386 
          
Mean  0.2564 0.4354 0.2936 0.2670 0.2802 0.3829 0.2367 0.4815 
Domestic 
Activities and 
School  Std.  Error  0.0328 0.0519 0.0406 0.0301 0.0458 0.0659 0.0313 0.0493 
          
Mean  0.2009 0.2281 0.2216 0.1899 0.2250 0.1982 0.1808 0.2544 
Market and 
Domestic 
Activities  Std.  Error  0.0358 0.0723 0.0401 0.0315 0.0438 0.0915 0.0344 0.0678 
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors are corrected for clustering. 
For all variables, N=1920.  
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Table B.3.  Descriptive statistics: Household and child characteristics 
   Mean  Std. Dev.       Mean  Std. Dev.
Child Characteristics       Household Composition    
Sex  (Boy=1)  0.545 0.498  Own  Child  0.803 0.398 
Ethnicity      Number of Girls in HH  1.407  1.215 
Sonrai  0.665  0.472  Number of Boys in HH  1.722  1.361 
Tamasheq  0.134  0.341  Number of Adult Women in HH  1.697  1.277 
Peuhl  0.111  0.313  Number of Adult Men in HH  1.638  1.148 
Bambara 0.040  0.196  Household Assets and Unearned Income    
Other Ethnicity  0.050  0.217  Herd Size  19.18  19.54 
Age Dummies     Herd  Value  (FCFA)  531946  57044 
Age 10  0.201  0.401  Agricultural Capital (FCFA)  47051  12744 
Age 11  0.075  0.264  Durables (FCFA)  302671  69356 
Age 12  0.138  0.345  Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  40508  114356 
Age 13  0.085  0.279  Shocks    
Age 14  0.135  0.342  Production Shock    
Age 15  0.129  0.335  No Crop Loss  0.533  0.042 
Age 16  0.145  0.353  Small Crop Loss  0.217  0.034 
Age 17  0.091  0.287  Large Crop Loss  0.250  0.036 
Adult Characteristics     Labor Availability Shock    
Mother’s Education (1 if any education)  0.055  0.227  Adult Male Sick  0.131  0.019 
Father’s Education (1 if any education)  0.106  0.308  Adult Female Sick  0.212  0.045 
Age of Household Head  41.2  21.6  Child Sick  0.144  0.037 
Age of Household Head’s spouse   33.7  14.7       
Notes: All variables are population weighted means and the standard errors are corrected for clustering. 
For all variables, N=1920.   
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Table B.4.  Descriptive statistics: Community characteristics 
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Regional Characteristics and Distribution    
Urban 151  0.086  0.281 
River Access  151  0.331  0.472 
Regional Indicators    
Niafunke   151  0.377  0.486 
Goundam   151  0.166  0.373 
Dire 151  0.159  0.367 
Tombouctou 151  0.099  0.300 
Rharous 151  0.073  0.261 
Bourem 151  0.119  0.325 
Kidal 151  0.007  0.081 
Access to Roads    
Road Connects with Village  151  0.139  0.347 
within 1-10km  151  0.417  0.495 
within 11-20km  151  0.232  0.423 
more than 20km  151  0.212  0.410 
Commune Population    
less than 5000  151  0.093  0.291 
5001-10000 151  0.225  0.419 
10001-20000 151  0.391  0.490 
20001-30000 151  0.146  0.354 
more than 30000  151  0.146  0.354 
Villages per Commune    
Less than 10  151  0.152  0.361 
11-20 151  0.205  0.405 
21-30 151  0.285  0.453 
more than 30  151  0.358  0.481 
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Table B.5.  School characteristics 
Primary School Characteristics     
Variable   Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. 
No Primary School Access  151  0.258  0.439 
Primary School in Village  151  0.563  0.498 
less than 5 km  151  0.099  0.300 
greater than 5 km  151  0.079  0.271 
Multiple Primary Schools in Village  151  0.132  0.395 
Student-Teacher Ratio--Primary  107  45.496  20.418 
Repetition Rate—Primary  98  0.305  0.148 
Boys Exam Pass Rate--Primary  71  0.651  0.266 
Girls Exam Pass Rate--Primary  67  0.590  0.325 
Secondary School Characteristics     
Secondary School in Village  151  0.159  0.367 
High School Characteristics     
High School in Village  151  0.026  0.161 
 














       
Niafunke  0.107 0.082 0.082 0.138 0.198 
Goundam  0.079 0.041 0.011 0.185 0.166 
Dire  0.183 0.165 0.018 0.064 0.009 
Tombouctou  0.270 0.255 0.102 0.153 0.163 
Rharous  0.329 0.146 0.195 0.000 0.890 
Bourem  0.071 0.503 0.420 0.330 0.260 
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APPENDIX C:  REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table C.1. Probit—Random effects 
  












Boy Indicator  0.073 1.812 -0.315 -0.653 0.281 -0.044 0.233
  (0.125) (0.139)***  (0.159)** (0.145)*** (0.133)**  (0.126) (0.158)
Ages             
age11  0.369 0.326 0.004 0.262 -0.065  0.405 0.102
  (0.225) (0.238) (0.291) (0.262) (0.246)   (0.227)*  (0.282)
age12  0.022 0.532 0.293 0.287 -0.105 0.212 0.303
  (0.183) (0.193)*** (0.236) (0.227) (0.198)  (0.188) (0.245)
age13  0.277 0.066 0.071 0.189 0.041 0.418 -0.017
  (0.213) (0.219) (0.277) (0.244) (0.226)   (0.215)*  (0.257)
age14  -0.082 0.182 0.005 -0.072 -0.238 0.057 -0.181
  (0.194) (0.198) (0.241) (0.229) (0.205) (0.197) (0.268)
age15  -0.472 0.751 0.509 0.003 -0.419 -0.342 0.198
   (0.216)** (0.215)***  (0.268)*  (0.234) (0.230)* (0.219) (0.250)
age16  -0.639 0.22 0.389 -0.17 -0.617 -0.4 -0.167
   (0.200)*** (0.197) (0.249) (0.228) (0.212)***   (0.202)**  (0.250)
age17  -1.01 0.41 0.32 0.178 -1.155 -0.942 0.013
   (0.244)***  (0.241)*  (0.287) (0.266) (0.269)***   (0.255)***  (0.289)
Household Composition             
Biological child indicator  0.282 0.008 -0.124 -0.393 0.171  0.084 -0.116
  (0.168)* (0.170) (0.209) (0.188)** (0.182)  (0.170) (0.204)
Number of girls  0.061 -0.183 -0.037 0.417 0.006 0.106 -0.01
  (0.062) (0.067)*** (0.087) (0.079)*** (0.070)    (0.063)*  (0.077)
Number of boys  0.025 -0.092 -0.02 0.15 0.028 0.044 -0.104
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.075) (0.063)** (0.063)  (0.057) (0.072)
Number of adult men  -0.092 0.057 -0.146 -0.343 -0.14 -0.147 -0.102
  (0.073) (0.072) (0.091) (0.082)***  (0.082)*   (0.077)*  (0.094)
Number of adult women  0.059 0.12 0.005 -0.141 0.111 0.007 0.003
  (0.077) (0.079) (0.105) (0.090) (0.085) (0.080) (0.100)
Household Assets and Unearned Income  
Livestock Value (FCFA)  0.033 -0.011 -0.013 -0.025 0.008 0.021 -0.02
   (0.013)** (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.022)
Herd Size (Number of Animals)  -0.012 0.007 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.011 0.008
   (0.006)** (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)   (0.006)*  (0.007)
Agricultural Capital (FCFA)  0.006 0.011 0 0.012 0.01 0.006 0.011
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Household Durables (FCFA)  0.005 -0.02 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.018 -0.019
  (0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.023)
Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  -0.051 -0.054 -0.009 -0.023 -0.059 -0.106 -0.083
   (0.030)* (0.041) (0.040) (0.051) (0.035)*   (0.038)***  (0.095)
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Any Mother's Education  1.041 0.279 1.005 1.265 0.674  1.095 1.5
(1=Yes)   (0.291)*** (0.320) (0.419)**  (0.382)***  (0.307)**   (0.285)***  (0.374)*** 
Any Father's Education  0.918 -0.218 -0.936 -0.095 0.695  0.617 -0.731
(1=Yes)   (0.221)*** (0.241) (0.311)***  (0.270) (0.242)***   (0.220)***  (0.326)** 
Age of HH Head  -0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.013 -0.004  -0.004 0.001
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)*** (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005)
Age of HH Head's spouse  0.004 -0.012 0.015 0.001 0.002  0.008 0.011
 (0.005) (0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007)
Community Characteristics             
Access to River  -0.149 -0.781 0.438 -0.022 -0.04  0.078 -0.651
(1=Yes) (0.241) (0.239)***  (0.309) (0.266) (0.273) (0.242) (0.328)** 
Roads   
within 1-10km  0.123 0.669 0.3 1.165 0.232  -0.114 1.354
 (0.271)   (0.256)***  (0.326) (0.312)***  (0.309)  (0.272) (0.361)*** 
within 11-20km  0.583 0.552 -0.014 0.676 0.553  0.141 0.948
   (0.341)* (0.315)*  (0.414) (0.362)*  (0.390)  (0.349) (0.413)** 
greater than 20km  0.483 1.162 1.332 1.356 0.472  0.416 1.481
 (0.376) (0.373)***  (0.536)**  (0.402)***  (0.422)  (0.375) (0.451)*** 
School Characteristics             
Primary School in Village  1.818 -0.07 1.404 -0.052 2.211  2.408 0.902
   (0.489)*** (0.433) (0.601)**  (0.484) (0.552)***   (0.502)***   (0.532)*
Primary School within 1-5km  0.198 -0.128 1.593 -0.719 0.002  0.689 0.387
 (0.639) (0.502) (0.702)**  (0.546) (0.770) (0.652) (0.604)
Primary School farther than 5km  -0.322 -0.093 1.356 -0.192 0.847  0.368 0.854
 (0.725) (0.610) (0.785)*  (0.664) (0.818) (0.743) (0.807)
Multiple Primary Schools  0.34 0.284 -0.308 0.291 0.013  0.145 0.201
(1=Yes) (0.266) (0.242) (0.312) (0.269) (0.306) (0.267) (0.327)
Student-Teacher Ratio  -0.014 -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.021 -0.017 -0.021
   (0.006)** (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)***   (0.006)***  (0.007)*** 
Repetition Rate  -0.117 0.907 0.554 1.297 0.398  -0.618 1.678
 (0.619) (0.638) (0.866) (0.699)*  (0.694)  (0.626) (0.815)** 
Exam Pass Rate-Boys  0.131 -0.558 -0.109 -0.647 -0.443  0.203 0.197
 (0.523) (0.517) (0.705) (0.607) (0.606) (0.548) (0.693)
Exam Pass Rate-Girls  0.144 -0.184 -0.123 -0.62 0.361  -0.283 -1.354
 (0.496) (0.500) (0.669) (0.592) (0.576) (0.520) (0.715)* 
Secondary School in Village  0.676 -0.784 -0.305 -0.062 0.615  0.159 -1.145
   (0.213)***  (0.225)***  (0.299) (0.257) (0.239)**  (0.218) (0.331)*** 
High School in Village  0.618 0.062 -0.729 2.033 0.998  0.955 1.596
 (0.416) (0.427) (0.602) (0.482)***  (0.470)**    (0.419)**  (0.575)*** 
Constant -1.358 -1.691 1.819 -1.987 -2.254 -1.657 -4.274
   (0.652)** (0.630)***  (0.879)**  (0.725)***  (0.727)***   (0.657)**  (0.828)*** 
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920  1920 1920
Number of hid  1045 1045 1045 1045 1045  1045 1045
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All coefficients are marginal effects. All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$  
District population, number of villages per commune, and ethnicity indicators are included in the regression, but results are not displayed.  
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Female Sick Child Sick 
Household Composition         
Number of girls  0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.034 0.024 
       (0.012)      (0.014)      (0.010) (0.011)***   (0.009)*** 
Number of boys  0.024 -0.002 0.008 0.008 0.018 
   (0.012)**       (0.011)      (0.007)      (0.009)  (0.007)** 
Number of adult men  0.015 0.004 0.001 0.02 0.014 
       (0.012)      (0.012)      (0.010) (0.011)*   (0.008)* 
Number of adult women  0.053 -0.008 -0.001 0.005 -0.029 
   (0.016)***       (0.013)      (0.011)      (0.012)  (0.010)*** 
Household Assets         
Livestock Value (FCFA)  -0.011 0.009 0.001 0.006 0 
   (0.004)**  (0.003)***       (0.002)      (0.004)      (0.001) 
Herd Size (Number of Animals)  0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0 
       (0.001)      (0.001) (0.001)***       (0.001) 0 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA)  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0 -0.001 
       (0.017)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.002) 
Household Durables (FCFA)  -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
       (0.004) 0      (0.003) (0.003)*       (0.001) 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  -0.004 0.002 -0.025 0.017 0.007 
       (0.008)      (0.003) (0.013)*  (0.008)**   (0.003)** 
Parental Education         
Any Mother's Education  -0.08 0.017 -0.014 0.035 0.013 
(1=Yes)   (0.045)*       (0.057)      (0.036)      (0.067)      (0.034) 
Any Father's Education  -0.059 0.07 0.006 0.005 -0.036 
(1=Yes)   (0.034)*       (0.046)      (0.038)      (0.038)  (0.019)* 
Age of HH Head  -0.001 -0.003 0 0.004 0.001 
       (0.001) (0.001)***       (0.001) (0.001)***   (0.001)* 
Age of HH Head's spouse  0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** -0.001 
Community Characteristics         
Access to River  -0.24 -0.01 -0.017 -0.027 0.034 
(1=Yes)   (0.062)***       (0.062)      (0.042)      (0.053)      (0.038) 
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 
Pseudo-R
2   
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table C.3. Marginal effects of shocks on children’s participation in work and school 
 
Probit— Shocks with Random Effects 
  
Withdrawn 









Large Crop Loss  1.084  0.845 -1.673 -0.433 -0.68 -0.371  -0.327
   (0.476)**   (0.246)***  (0.296)***    (0.264) (0.284)**    (0.255)    (0.307)
Small Crop Loss  0.111 0.71 -0.791 0.335 0.449 0.313  -0.128
     (0.450)   (0.235)***  (0.280)***    (0.257) (0.256)*    (0.234)    (0.296)
Adult Male Sick  0.584 0.232 -0.17 0.005 0.019 0.272  -0.166
(1=Yes)    (0.456)   (0.241)   (0.314)   (0.248)   (0.259)   (0.233)    (0.299)
Adult Female Sick  0.734 0.241 0.983 0.596 0.204 0.343  1.32
(1=Yes)   (0.425)*    (0.258) (0.346)***  (0.298)**    (0.273)   (0.245)   (0.367)*** 
Child Sick  -0.253 -0.182 -0.53 -0.007 -0.12 -0.145  0.118
(1=Yes)    (0.512)    (0.284)   (0.349)   (0.316)   (0.308)   (0.277)    (0.397)
Observations 786  1920 1920 1920 1920 1920  1920
Number of hid  483  1045 1045 1045 1045 1045  1045
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.   
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
All coefficients are marginal effects. 
All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$.  
All covariates are estimated in the regression, but only the shock results are displayed.  
  
  Multivariate Probit Estimates 
  Withdrawl Farm  Work 
Family 
Business  Child Care 
Large Crop Loss  0.824 0.974 -1.025 -0.872 
 (0.289)*** (0.293)*** (0.299)*** (0.509)* 
Small Crop Loss  0.232 0.673 0.102 -0.345 
     (0.257) (0.301)**    (0.229)   (0.322) 
Adult Male Sick  0.463 0.185 0.305 0.275 
(1=Yes)    (0.350)   (0.239)   (0.360)   (0.216) 
Adult Female Sick  0.512 0.111 0.702 0.548 
(1=Yes)   (0.246)**   (0.221) (0.238)***  (0.252)** 
Child Sick  -0.054 0.17 -0.19 0.051 
(1=Yes)    (0.257)   (0.269)   (0.265)   (0.332) 
Observations 786 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients are marginal effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$.  
All covariates are estimated in the regression, but only the shock results are displayed.   
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Table C.4. Probit—Crop shocks with asset interactions and random effects 
 
Withdrawn 
from School  Farm Work Child Care Market-School Home-School  Market-Home
Durables  x  -0.32 -0.099 0.062 0.091 0.053 -0.018
Large Crop Loss  (0.207)  (0.066)   (0.076)   (0.079) (0.090)  (0.094)
Durables x  -0.024  -0.068 -0.033 0.034 0.023  -0.21
Small Crop Loss  (0.133)  (0.054) (0.023)   (0.040) (0.039)  (0.127)* 
Agricultural  1.6 -0.168 -1.855 -1.134 -1.888 -0.948
Capital x  (1.124)  (0.505) (0.664)*** (0.636)*  (0.779)**  (0.737)
Large Crop Loss     
Agricultural    0.609 -0.255 0.765 0.135 -0.293 -0.208
Capital x  (1.063)  (0.417)   (0.629)   (0.393) (0.419)  (0.502)
Small Crop Loss     
Livestock Value x  -0.18  0 0.019 0.057 0.064  0.051
Large Crop Loss  (0.137)  (0.047)   (0.052)   (0.054) (0.054)  (0.061)
Livestock Value x  -0.055  -0.048 -0.022 0.048 0.006  0.012
Small Crop Loss  (0.067)   (0.025)*    (0.032) (0.024)**  (0.022)  (0.036)
Observations  786 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
Number  of  hid  483 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics are in parenthesis All coefficients are marginal effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied by 100000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. 
All covariates estimated in the regression, but only asset interactions are displayed.   
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Table C.5.  Probit—Health shocks with asset interactions and random effects 
  
Withdrawn 
from School  Farm Work Child CareMarket-School Home-School  Market-Home
Durables x  -0.253  -0.194 -0.132 -0.075 0.042  -0.187
Sick Male     (0.193)   (0.089)**  (0.079)*     (0.085)     (0.078)   (0.103)* 
    
Durables x      0.198  0.048 -0.073 -0.087 -0.107  -0.121
Sick Female  (0.165)      (0.084)    (0.098)    (0.098)     (0.097)      (0.136)
    
Durables x  0.248  0.007 0.05 0.002 -0.025  -0.007
Sick Child     (0.206)      (0.049)    (0.102)    (0.033)     (0.043)      (0.135)
    
Agricultural 0.029  0.065 0.02 0.045 0.002  -0.012
Capital X  (0.549)      (0.051)    (0.069)    (0.070)     (0.053)      (0.111)
Sick Male     
    
Agricultural   0.542  0.024 0.997 0.83 0.332  0.786
Capital x  (0.871)      (0.514) (0.571)*     (0.556)     (0.520)      (0.768)
Sick Female     
    
Agricultural   -0.193  -0.087 -1.352 -0.669 -0.282 -0.993
Capital x     (1.513)      (0.649) (0.712)*     (0.678)     (0.646)      (0.860)
Sick Child     
    
Livestock Value  0.077  0.153 0.114 0.071 0.04  0.098
x Sick Male  (0.078)   (0.055)***  (0.047)**     (0.045)     (0.042)   (0.053)* 
    
Livestock Value  -0.174  -0.076 -0.051 0.072 0.127  0.019
x Sick Female  (0.106)      (0.046)    (0.054)    (0.047)  (0.047)***      (0.072)
    
Livestock Value  -0.167  -0.038 0.054 -0.028 -0.125  0.009
X Sick Child     (0.180)      (0.060)    (0.066)    (0.048) (0.049)**      (0.078)
Observations 786  1920 1920 1920 1920  1920
Number of hid  483  1045 1045 1045 1045  1045
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All coefficients are marginal effects. 
All coefficients of variables valued in FCFA are multiplied by 100 000 FCFA, roughly 200 US$. 
All covariates estimated in the regression, but only asset interaction results displayed 
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Table C.6. Panel estimates 
  School Farm 
Family 
Business Child  Care 
Large Crop Loss 2006  0.0003 -0.069 0.076 -0.366 
  (.0004)**    (0.273)    (0.115) (0.135)*** 
Large Crop Loss 1997  6.60E-07 0.043 -0.305 -0.053 
  (0.000)    (0.076)    (0.227)    (0.206) 
Asset-Shock Interaction 2006  -5.50E-06 0.099 0.043 -0.112 
 (0.000)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)** (0.042)*** 
Asset-Shock Interaction 1997  6.65E-08 -0.0613 0.115 -0.05 
   (0.000)    (0.099) (0.048)** (-.085) 
Observations 186 186 186 186 
Notes: Regression controls for gender, ethnicity, and parent's education.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C.7.  Participation equations controlling for household random effects, disaggregated by gender  
  School    Farm    Family Business    Child Care   
Sample Restriction  Girls  Boys  Difference Girls Boys  Difference  Girls  Boys Difference Girls  Boys  Difference 
Household Composition                         
Biological child indicator  0.597  0.1 0.497 0.033 -0.172 0.205  -0.24 0.197 -0.437 -0.349 -0.499 0.15 
 (0.237)**  (0.215) (0.253) (0.267)  (0.292) (0.333) (0.257) (0.261)*  
Number of girls  -0.008  0.103 -0.111 -0.11 -0.165 0.055  -0.2 0.03 -0.23 0.371 0.416 -0.045 
 (0.081) (0.077) (0.094) (0.097)*    (0.122) (0.125) (0.108)*** (0.098)***   
Number of boys  -0.01  0.035 -0.045 0.049 -0.179 0.228  0.096 -0.019 0.115 0.17 0.071 0.099 
 (0.074) (0.067) (0.077) (0.081)**   (0.100) (0.108) (0.082)**  (0.080)  
Number of adult men  -0.027  -0.184 0.157 0.038 0.072 -0.034 -0.066 -0.27 0.204 -0.307 -0.366 0.059 
 (0.095)  (0.084)**  (0.104) (0.099)   (0.123) (0.124)** (0.112)***   (0.098)***  
Number of adult women  -0.003  0.085 -0.088 0.125 0.094 0.031 -0.101 0.252 -0.353 -0.251 -0.03 -0.221 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.103) (0.117)   (0.139) (0.156) (0.122)** (0.108)  
Household Assets and Unearned Income                       
Livestock Value (FCFA)  0.02  0.063 -0.043 -0.018 -0.009 -0.009 -0.01 -0.031 0.021 -0.011 -0.044 0.033 
 (0.016)  (0.023)***  (0.020) (0.018)  (0.020) (0.017)* (0.023) (0.028)  
Herd Size (Number of Animals)  -0.013  -0.013 0 0.012 0.008 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.015 -0.022 
 (0.007)* (0.008)*  (0.007)*  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)  
Agricultural Capital (FCFA)  -0.009  0 -0.009 -0.031 0.037 -0.068  0.007 0 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.007 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.145) (0.044)  (0.038) (0.017) (0.025) (0.016)  
Household Durables (FCFA)  0.004  0.049 -0.045 -0.028 -0.004 -0.024  0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.015 0.013 0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.027)*  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.016) (0.023)  
Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  -0.064  -0.024 -0.04 -0.016 -0.082 0.066 -0.044 0.048 -0.092 -0.049 -0.036 -0.013 
 (0.035)*  (0.039) (0.059) (0.049)*   (0.050) (0.048) (0.058) (0.077)  
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Table C.7. Continued 
  School    Farm    Family Business    Child Care   
Sample Restriction  Girls  Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference Girls Boys Difference 
Adult Characteristics                         
Any Mother's Education  0.764  1.452 -0.688 0.749 -0.113 0.862  1.138 0.576 0.562 1.24 1.62 -0.38 
(1=Yes) (0.362)**  (0.369)***  (0.430)*  (0.423)  (0.531)** (0.595) (0.512)**   (0.478)***   
Any Father's Education  1.102  0.576 0.526 -0.31 -0.208 -0.102 -0.922 -0.698 -0.224 0.111 -0.445 0.556 
(1=Yes) (0.273)***  (0.263)**  (0.331)   (0.320)   (0.390)**  (0.457)  (0.344)  (0.346)  
Age of HH Head  -0.002  -0.008 0.006 0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0.01 0.015 -0.005 
 (0.005)  (0.004)*  (0.005) (0.005)     (0.007)  (0.007) (0.006)*  (0.006)***   
Age of HH Head's spouse  0.007  0.005 0.002 -0.011 -0.014 0.003  0.02 0.012 0.008 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 
   (0.007)   (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008)*    (0.009)**  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
School Characteristics                         
Primary School in Village  1.438  1.865 -0.427 0.012 -1.052 1.064 1.963 1.151 0.812 -0.136 0.321 -0.457 
   (0.625)**   (0.599)***   (0.633)  (0.666)   (0.882)**  (0.826)  (0.653)  (0.603)  
Secondary School in Village  0.094  0.909 -0.815 -0.855 -0.573 -0.282 0.007 -0.272 0.279 -0.534 0.362 -0.896 
   (0.286)   (0.247)***  (0.329)***  (0.302)*     (0.407)  (0.414)  (0.335)  (0.319)  
High School in Village  1.107  -0.153 1.26 0.398 -0.251 0.649  -0.388 -1.39 1.002 2.193 1.866 0.327 
   (0.556)**   (0.503)  (0.631)  (0.571)    (0.828)  (0.855) (0.646)***  (0.601)***   
Constant -0.642  -1.357 0.715 -1.546 0.689 -2.235 1.997 1.261 0.736 -2.576 -2.289 -0.287 
    (0.855)   (0.784)*    (0.861)*   (0.939)     (1.235)  (1.240)   (0.953)***  (0.937)**    
Observations 864  1056 864 1056   864 1056 864 1056  
Number of hid  629  704 629 704   629 704 629 704  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All covariates are included in the regression.  
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Table C.8.  Comparison of no village level effects, fixed effects and random effects estimates 
  School  Farm  Family Business  Child Care 




























Boy Indicator  -0.007  -0.032 0.025 0.415 0.495 1.035 -0.077 -0.105 -0.152 -0.156 -0.207 -0.331 
  (0.039)   (0.058)  (0.086) (0.053)*** (0.067)*** (0.082)*** 
(0.021)**
* (0.037)***   (0.097) (0.044)*** (0.055)***  (0.094)*** 
Household Composition                     
Biological child indicator  0.053  0.03 0.121 0.063 0.031 0.04 0.037 0.034 -0.131 -0.02 -0.063 -0.29 
  (0.041)   (0.064)  (0.097) (0.046)  (0.056)  (0.090) (0.036)  (0.064)  (0.105) (0.049)  (0.075) (0.103)*** 
Number of girls  0.015  0.025 0.038 -0.049 -0.049 -0.073 0.007 0 -0.09 0.096 0.108 0.212 
  (0.014)   (0.019)  (0.032) (0.015)*** (0.021)**  (0.030)**  (0.012)  (0.023) (0.037)**  (0.025)*** (0.036)***  (0.037)*** 
Number of boys  0.002  0.04 0.042 -0.041 -0.04 -0.033 -0.015 -0.008 0.011 0.051 0.083 0.054 
  (0.011)  (0.018)**   (0.028) (0.016)** (0.022)*   (0.025) (0.01)  (0.019)  (0.031) (0.020)*** (0.029)***  (0.029)* 
Number of adult men  -0.015  -0.027 -0.063 0.025 0.045 0.023 -0.013 0.013 -0.006 -0.051 -0.064 -0.191 
  (0.014)   (0.020) (0.037)*  (0.018)  (0.025)*   (0.033) (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.042) (0.022)** (0.032)**  (0.041)*** 
Number of adult women  0.01  -0.018 0.002 0.059 0.063 0.047 0.002 -0.011 0.029 -0.04 -0.037 -0.085 
  (0.019)   (0.030)  (0.039) (0.021)*** (0.025)**   (0.036) (0.016)  (0.034)  (0.048) (0.018)**  (0.031) (0.045)* 
Household Assets and  
Unearned Income                     
Livestock Value (FCFA)  0.008  0.005 0.015 -0.002 -0.01 -0.007 0 -0.002 -0.01 -0.008 -0.01 -0.018 
  (0.003)**   (0.004) (0.007)**  (0.004) (0.005)*   (0.006) -0.002  (0.003) (0.006)*  (0.005)  (0.007) (0.010)* 
Herd Size (Number of 
Animals)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0 0.001 0.005 0.007 
  (0.001)   (0.002) (0.003)*  (0.001)*  (0.002)  (0.003) -0.001 (0.001)**   (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)*  (0.004)* 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA)  0.001  0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.008 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  (0.005) (0.001)** (0.001)***  (0.005) -0.002 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.007) 
Household Durables (FCFA)  0.001  0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.006 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 0 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  -0.008  -0.011 -0.026 -0.025 -0.029 -0.032 0.005 0.008 0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.029 
 (0.005)  (0.008) (0.014)*  (0.008)*** (0.006)***  (0.018)* (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024)  
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Table C.8. Continued 
  School  Farm  Family Business  Child Care 




























Adult Characteristics                     
Any Mother’s Education  0.153  0.132 0.569 -0.07 -0.082 0.187 0.077 0.056 0.435 0.07 0.13 0.789 
(1=Yes)  (0.107)   (0.116) (0.137)***  (0.114)  (0.152)  (0.143) (0.053)  (0.117) (0.160)***  (0.11)  (0.112) (0.180)*** 
Any Father’s Education  0.124  0.168 0.464 -0.076 -0.105 -0.213 -0.113 -0.103 -0.258 0.042 0.072 -0.004 
(1=Yes)  (0.068)*   (0.082)**  (0.104)***  (0.065)  (0.080) (0.106)**  (0.067)*  (0.104) (0.122)**  (0.079)  (0.092)  (0.124) 
Age of HH Head  0  0 -0.002 0 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)*  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)***  (0.001)*  (0.002) (0.002)** 
Age of HH Head's spouse  0.002  0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 0 -0.002 0.008 0 -0.001 0 
  (0.001)   (0.002)*   (0.003) (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.003)**  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003)**  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
School Characteristics                     
Primary School in Village  0.34  -0.34 1.195 -0.076 0.253 -0.068 0.321 0.055 0.751 0.062 0.093 0.166 
  (0.051)***  (0.049)***  (0.415)***  (0.113)  (0.154)  (0.299) (0.158)**  (0.241)  (0.624) (0.129)  (0.085)  (0.429) 
Secondary School in Village  0.167  -0.129 0.351 -0.058 -0.426 -0.353 -0.095 0.55 -0.054 -0.017 -0.26 0.13 
 (0.061)***  (0.060)**    (0.226) (0.066) (0.033)***  (0.188)*  (0.081)  (0.059)***   (0.398) (0.07) (0.060)***   (0.280) 
High School in Village  0.052  0.435 0.315 0.151 -0.193 -0.307 -0.165 0.153 -0.318 0.539 0.487 1.548 
   (0.118)  (0.065)***   (0.444) (0.162)  (0.233)  (0.387) (0.236) (0.083)*   (0.705) (0.096)***  (0.087)*** (0.543)*** 
Observations 1920  1474 1920 1920 1766 1920 1920 1321 1920 1920 1422 1920 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All covariates are included in the regression. 
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Table C.9. Multivariate probit estimates 
   School  Farm Work
Family 
Business Child  Care 
Boy Indicator  -0.029 1.095 -0.28 -0.419 
     (0.120) (0.154)*** (0.077)*** (0.115)*** 
Household Composition         
Biological child indicator  0.146 0.157 0.14 -0.056 
     (0.133)    (0.114)    (0.123)    (0.124) 
Number of girls  0.047 -0.122 0.022 0.244 
     (0.042) (0.038)***     (0.044)  (0.065)*** 
Number of boys  0.01 -0.103 -0.057 0.137 
     (0.034) (0.041)**     (0.038)  (0.052)*** 
Number of adult men  -0.037 0.057 -0.047 -0.138 
     (0.041)    (0.046)    (0.041)  (0.056)** 
Number of adult women  0.02 0.15 0.012 -0.098 
     (0.059) (0.053)***     (0.060)  (0.048)** 
Household Assets and Unearned Income         
Livestock Value (FCFA)  0.024 -0.005 0.001 -0.022 
  (0.011)**     (0.010)    (0.009)  (0.013)* 
Herd Size (Number of Animals)  -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.002 
     (0.004) (0.003)*     (0.003)    (0.005) 
Agricultural Capital (FCFA)  0.004 0.006 -0.005 0.009 
     (0.004) (0.003)**   (0.007)  (0.006) 
Household Durables (FCFA)  0.002 -0.011 0.001 0.009 
   (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
Migrant Remittances (FCFA)  -0.026 -0.066 0.017 -0.021 
   (0.016) (0.020)***   (0.025)  (0.024) 
Parental Education         
Any Mother's Education  0.412 -0.177 0.315 0.25 
(1=Yes)     (0.280)    (0.290)    (0.253)    (0.264) 
Any Father's Education  0.378 -0.198 -0.348 0.07 
(1=Yes)  (0.176)**     (0.168) (0.193)*     (0.197) 
Age of HH Head  -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005 
     (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Age of HH Head's spouse  0.005 -0.011 0.001 -0.001 
     (0.004) (0.003)***     (0.004)    (0.004) 
Community Characteristics         
Access to River  -0.16 -0.257 0.085 0.182 
(1=Yes)     (0.175)    (0.193)    (0.248)    (0.184) 
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Table C.9. Continued 
   School  Farm Work
Family 
Business Child  Care 
Roads   
within 1-10km  0.525 0.355 0.092 0.677 
  (0.168)***     (0.285)    (0.265)  (0.304)** 
within 11-20km  0.542 0.238 0.114 0.536 
  (0.205)***     (0.281)    (0.393)    (0.330) 
greater than 20km  0.926 0.436 0.386 0.83 
  (0.261)***     (0.340)    (0.362)  (0.344)** 
Commune Population         
less than 5000 people  0.744 -0.142 -0.122 -0.919 
     (0.474)    (0.372)  (0.589)  (0.473)* 
5-10,000 people  -0.1 -0.595 1.158 -0.422 
   (0.329) (0.289)**  (0.411)***   (0.379) 
10-20,000 people  0.185 0.823 -0.802 -0.823 
    (0.265) (0.232)***  (0.326)**   (0.244)*** 
Villages per Commune         
fewer than 10  0.616 1.912 -2.166 -0.934 
   (0.486) (0.406)***  (0.626)***   (0.541)* 
11-20 villages  0.652 1.31 -1.821 -0.582 
 (0.331)**  (0.335)***  (0.502)***    (0.404) 
21-30 villages  0.253 0.453 -0.881 0.347 
   (0.287)  (0.291) (0.446)**   (0.324) 
School Characteristics:  Primary         
Primary School in Village  1.612 -0.172 0.955 0.206 
  (0.482)***   (0.294)  (0.430)**   (0.343) 
Primary School within 1-5km  0.938 -0.01 0.754 -0.013 
  (0.549)*   (0.343) (0.425)*   (0.362) 
Primary School farther than 5km  -0.194 -0.174 1.045 0.173 
   (0.610)  (0.434) (0.588)*   (0.476) 
Multiple Primary Schools  0.745 0.017 -0.006 -0.138 
(1=Yes)  (0.201)***   (0.237)  (0.335)  (0.302) 
Student-Teacher Ratio  -0.011 0.001 -0.011 -0.004 
  (0.006)*   (0.004) (0.006)*   (0.005) 
Secondary School in Village  0.482 -0.153 -0.336 -0.058 
  (0.166)***   (0.167)  (0.258)  (0.184) 
High School in Village  0.149 0.368 -0.47 1.7 
   (0.331)  (0.450)  (0.667)  (0.585)*** 
Constant -2.281 -1.628 1.254 -1.98 
   (0.588)*** (0.555)*** (0.694)* (0.617)*** 
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Durables x    -0.082 -0.019 -0.409 0.045 
Large Crop Loss  (1.140) (0.240) (2.84)**  (0.330) 
    
Durables x    -0.002 -0.023 0.25 0.01 
Small Crop Loss  (0.080) (1.320) (2.47)*  (0.380) 
    
Agricultural 0.618 -0.041 -1.778 -0.416 
Capital x    (1.110) (0.060) (1.910) (0.410) 
Large Crop Loss   
    
Agricultural   -0.858 0.247 0.492 -0.616 
Capital x    (1.340) (0.550) (0.750) (0.870) 
Small Crop Loss   
    
Livestock Value x  -0.17 -0.026 0.055 -0.238 
Large Crop Loss  (2.46)*  (0.510) (1.070) (1.590) 
    
Livestock Value x  -0.073 0.003 0.039 0.017 
Small Crop Loss  (1.240) (0.080) (1.130) (0.430) 
Observations 786  
Notes: Robust z statistics are in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All covariates estimated are in the regression.  
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Durables x  -0.734 -0.102 -0.049 -0.088 
Sick Male  (2.75)**   (1.370)  (0.540)  (1.540) 
   
Durables x  0.189 0.087 -0.19 -0.024 
Sick Female   (1.900)  (1.420) (2.75)**   (0.490) 
   
Durables x  0.149 0.059 0.161 0.105 
Sick Child   (0.860)  (0.380)  (1.400)  (0.530) 
   
Agricultural -0.735 0.235 -1.605 -0.19 
Capital X   (0.690)  (0.350)  (1.600) (1.99)* 
Sick Male   
   
Agricultural   -0.742 -0.284 -0.128 -0.212 
Capital x   (1.340)  (0.590)  (0.290)  (0.440) 
Sick Female   
   
Agricultural   1.432 -0.738 1.331 -1.273 
Capital x   (1.340)  (0.830)  (1.420)  (1.560) 
Sick Child   
   
Livestock Value  0.136 0.074 0.013 0.05 
x Sick Male   (3.75)**   (1.890)  (0.210) (2.12)* 
   
Livestock Value  -0.141 -0.095 -0.002 -0.042 
x Sick Female  (2.54)*  (2.35)*   (0.040)  (1.520) 
   
Livestock Value  -0.158 0.056 -0.002 -0.034 
X Sick Child   (1.440)  (1.280)  (0.040)  (0.480) 
Observations 786     
Notes: Robust z statistics are in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All covariates are included in the regression.  
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